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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is questionable whether a less-fortunate title than Active 
Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution could have been 
applied to Justice Breyer’s rejoinder to Justice Scalia’s 1997 volume 
on his interpretive philosophy.1  Employed as it is in the context of 
the judicial process, “active liberty” calls to mind the ill-defined 
concept of “judicial activism.”  Lambasting the federal judiciary with 
                                                 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law.  
Thanks to my father, Richard Huffman, for his lifelong mentorship, to my wife, 
Patricia Galvan, for her support, and to Robert Flint, Noah Messing, Donna Nagy, 
Letha Schwiesow,  Michael Solimine, and Judge Stephen Trott for helpful edits 
and suggestions.  All opinions and errors are mine. 
1. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1997).  Although it is certainly a free-standing tome, Justice Breyer 
concludes Active Liberty with a chapter titled “A Serious Objection,” in which he 
ably denudes textualist philosophy and discusses why his own philosophy should 
be thought superior.  STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 115-32 (2005).  Justice 
Breyer has emerged in recent years as the public spokesman for the Court’s 
centrist faction, while Justice Scalia has remained the lion of the right.  In one 
example, the two colleagues recently debated each other at American University 
on the use of foreign authority in judicial opinions.  Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, 
U.S. Supreme Court & Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. 
Ass’n of Constitutional Law Discussion: Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Law 
Court Decisions (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1352357/posts) [hereinafter Relevance 
of Foreign Law].  
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cries of judicial activism has come into vogue in recent years.2  
Justice Breyer likely would respond that in taking his title to task, the 
 
2. See David Limbaugh, Benchmarks of Activism, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
2005, at A16, available at http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20050918-
102750-2582r.htm (noting that the new litigation by Michael Newdow “highlights 
the judicial activism of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme 
Court in their Establishment Clause jurisprudence”). 
Of course, the phrase is quite meaningless.  It neither describes an interpretive 
philosophy nor is more readily applicable to opinions written by Justice Breyer 
than to opinions written by Justice Scalia.  One writer argues persuasively that the 
overuse of the phrase “judicial activism” in political discourse has rendered the 
term effectively meaningless—such that it now means little more than 
disagreement with a decision.  Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and 
Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1141-82 (2002); cf. Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 291, 299 (Apr. 29, 2005) (arguing 
that conservative jurists are as deserving of the label “activist” as are liberal 
jurists), available at http://www.greenbag.org/Tribe.pdf. 
Those who view “activism” as manifesting a lack of respect for co-equal 
branches of government should prefer Justice Breyer’s approach to that of Justice 
Scalia.  Justice Breyer is much less likely than his colleague to vote to strike down 
an enactment as unconstitutional.  See Editorial, Shaping the Court in Their Image, 
THE OREGONIAN, Aug. 16, 2005, available at http://www.oregonlive. 
com/editorials (“Over the past decade, the two Supreme Court justices most likely 
to vote to overturn congressional laws are the two most conservative: Antonin 
Scalia and Clarence Thomas.”); Jeffrey Toobin, Breyer’s Big Idea: The Justice’s 
Vision for a Progressive Revival on the Supreme Court, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 
31, 2005, at 36-38, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact 
/content/articles/051031fa_fact (“[B]etween 1994 and 2005 . . . , Breyer voted to 
strike down laws twenty-eight percent of the time—less often than any other 
Justice.  Clarence Thomas voted to overrule Congress sixty-six percent of the time, 
more than any other Justice.”). 
One criticism of defining “activism” in the fashion it is defined in this 
footnote is that “conservative” activism tends to invalidate legislation based on a 
narrow—what some might call “self-disciplined”—construction of the 
Constitution’s Commerce Clause.  See infra note 20 and accompanying text 
(discussing Justice Alito’s view on judicial self-discipline).  The same critics say 
“liberal” activism involves overturning legislation because of individual rights 
read into the Constitution that do not exist.  One rejoinder to this criticism, that 
narrow interpretations are no less or more “activist” than are broad interpretations, 
is discussed in note 20, infra.  Another rejoinder is that statistical analysis of votes 
to overturn automatically will have the effect of smoothing over anecdotal 
instances of the reasons for votes to overturn.  A third is that no agreement exists 
as to “legitimate” as opposed to “illegitimate” bases for overturning legislation.  
For example, the nearly uncited Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has 
been argued to provide textual support for expansive rights-based interpretations of 
the U.S. Constitution.  See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2005). 
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reviewer missed the point.  “Active liberty,” to Justice Breyer, has 
little to do with proactive judicial decision-making.  It is defined as 
the power and commensurate responsibility of citizens to engage in 
self-government, and, for Justice Breyer’s purposes, it defines the 
role of judges in interpreting texts—constitutional or statutory—as 
seeking to preserve and protect that democratic ideal, through a 
process of understanding texts’ essential purposes and interpreting 
them to accomplish those purposes.3  On the sound-bite front, Justice 
Scalia, in A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, 
offers “textualism,”4 while Justice Breyer risks further branding with 
“activism.”  Justice Scalia has one more seeming advantage: his 
forty-five pages of text promises the elegance of simplicity.5  Justice 
Breyer took 135 pages for his contrary proposal.  Judge Stephen 
Trott of the Ninth Circuit used to say to his clerks that the analysis of 
a case should be reducible to a concise bench memorandum of 
prescribed maximum length.  Implicitly, arguments not susceptible 
to such fore-shortening were suspicious.6
But even Judge Trott permitted more pages if the subject was 
so inherently important or complex that fewer would not suffice.  
That is the case with Justice Breyer’s responsive salvo in the 
argument over statutory and constitutional interpretation, which this 
reviewer thinks appropriately recognizes the difficulty in and 
importance of the interpretive process.  Justice Scalia’s A Matter of 
 
3. As Justice Breyer explained his title in an interview with NPR Supreme 
Court correspondent Nina Totenberg, “I say ‘active liberty’ because I want to 
stress that democracy works if—and only if—the average citizen participates.” All 
Things Considered: Supreme Court Justice Breyer on ‘Active Liberty’ (NPR radio 
broadcast Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=4929668.  Justice Breyer “defines the term ‘active liberty’ as a 
sharing of the nation’s sovereign authority with its citizens.”  BREYER, supra note 
1, at 15. 
4. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23 (“The philosophy of interpretation I have 
described above is known as textualism.”). 
5. See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 3-47 (elaborating on his philosophy of 
textualism and arguing for originalism in less than fifty pages).  Justice Scalia does 
require the last twenty-one pages of his book, Id. at 129-49, to respond to 
Professors Gordon Wood, Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon and Ronald 
Dworkin, whose responses to Justice Scalia’s opening remarks also were included 
in the volume.  Id. at 49-127.  Justice Scalia also recognizes that in A Matter of 
Interpretation, he did not exhaust “the vast topic of textual interpretation.”  Id. at 
37. 
6. The author clerked for Judge Trott in 1998 and 1999 (and recalls only 
once exceeding the page limit). 
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Interpretation is not merely simple, it is simplistic, and improperly 
so.7  In its simplicity it ignores the complexity of the process of 
interpreting language that often lacks a commonly-understood, 
everyday meaning. 
With specific regard to statutory language, Justice Breyer 
explores the interpretive problem that arises when  
 
statutory language does not clearly answer the 
question of what the statute means or how it applies. . 
. .  Perhaps [Congress] failed to use its own drafting 
expertise or failed to have committee hearings, 
writing legislation on the floor instead. . . .  Perhaps 
no one in Congress thought about how the statute 
would apply in certain circumstances.  Perhaps it is 
impossible to use language that foresees how a statute 
should apply in all relevant circumstances.8   
 
And constitutional interpretation is, if anything, a thornier problem.  
Justice Scalia himself noted: “The problem [of constitutional 
interpretation] . . . is distinctive, not because special principles of 
interpretation apply, but because the usual principles are being 
applied to an unusual text.”9
Active Liberty, which “originally took the form of the Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values presented at Harvard University in 
2004”10 (Justice Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation was taken from 
the same series nine years earlier11), considers the theme of active 
liberty “as falling within an interpretive tradition and consistent with 
the Constitution’s history.”12  Justice Breyer also describes a tension 
 
7. See Gordon S. Wood, Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 49, 58 (1997) (“[T]he problem 
with which Justice Scalia is dealing is one deeply rooted in our history, and as such 
it is probably not as susceptible to solution as he implies.”). 
8. BREYER, supra note 1, at 85-86. 
9. Both Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia treat constitutional interpretation as 
an extension of the problem of statutory interpretation.  See infra note 53 and 
accompanying text.  However, obvious differences exist. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 
37. 
10. BREYER, supra note 1, at ix. 
11. SCALIA, supra note 1, at xii (preface by Professor Amy Gutmann). 
12. See BREYER, supra note 1, at vii (combining the titles of individual 
lectures). 
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between different judges’ competing emphases in the process of 
statutory or constitutional interpretation.  “Some judges emphasize 
the use of language, history, and tradition.  Others emphasize 
purpose and consequence.  These differences in emphasis matter—
and this book will explain why.”13
The two colleagues are not the first Members of the U.S. 
Supreme Court to articulate their interpretive philosophies outside of 
their work for the Court.14  But of the active members of the Court, 
only Justices Breyer and Scalia have attempted such complete public 
expositions of their views on the subject.  Perhaps the best accolades 
for Justice Scalia come from the pen of one of his most vociferous 
critics.  Professor Laurence Tribe concedes the difficulty of penning 
a coherent theory of interpretation—so difficult, in fact, that he 
declines to attempt to express his own theory.15  No surprise, then, 
that, as one reviewer noted, Justice Breyer’s is the first effort outside 
of judicial opinions to rebut Justice Scalia’s and to propose an 
alternate approach to interpretation.16  And these two colleagues 
have become de facto spokespersons for their respective wings—
Justice Breyer, the centrist, Justice Scalia, the conservative—of the 
federal judiciary.17  Professor Tribe observed the “contrasting 
 
13. BREYER, supra note 1, at 8. 
14. See Mary Ann Glendon, Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 95, 97-98 (1997) (citing works 
by Justice Cardozo while on the New York Court of Appeals and Justice 
Frankfurter); see also O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 
HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899) (discussing his theory of interpretation while a Justice 
on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, before appointment to the U.S. 
Supreme Court). 
15. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 72-73 (1997).  Another 
critic, Professor Ronald Dworkin, says of Justice Scalia’s thoughts on statutory 
interpretation: “[H]e has set out with laudable clarity a sensible account.”  Ronald 
Dworkin, Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 115 (1997). 
16. Toobin, supra note 2, at 36. 
17. Where on the ill-defined political spectrum to place Justice Breyer and 
Justice Scalia might be the subject of much debate.  Although Justice Breyer 
anecdotally is known generally to vote with other Democratic appointees and left-
leaning Republican appointees Justices Stevens and Souter, and Justice Scalia 
anecdotally is known generally to vote with other Republican appointees, each 
Justice has broken ranks with his usual voting bloc on specific issues.  Justice 
Breyer was the swing vote in the recent Ten Commandments decisions, McCreary 
County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005), and Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 
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thinking articulated by Justices Breyer and Scalia” on issues of 
statutory interpretation.18  This is exemplified by the colleagues’ 
occasional concurrence in each others’ opinions or in the judgments 
reached, while advancing their own preferred approaches.19
Active Liberty and A Matter of Interpretation in some manner 
permit apples-to-apples comparison.  For example, both Justices 
have applied their respective approaches both to statutory and to 
constitutional interpretation, treating the two analyses as parts of a 
unified whole.20  Both have also examined the host of available 
(2005), in which he voted in favor of striking down the Kentucky monument and 
in favor of maintaining the Texas monument.  On a recent law-and-order issue, 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Justice Breyer voted in favor of 
upholding the United States Sentencing Guidelines against a Sixth Amendment 
challenge.  In the line of authorities building up to the invalidation of the 
sentencing guidelines, of which Booker is the most recent, Justice Scalia has been 
a leading advocate of overturning the legislation on the grounds of an originalist 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, and wrote for a majority comprised of 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and himself.  See, e.g., Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that Blakely’s sentence violated his 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury).  This review describes their political 
leanings based on the author’s own understanding of the anecdotal evidence. 
18. Tribe, supra note 2, at 298. 
19. See, e.g., Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1462 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia) (“I would 
add that context, not just literal text, will often lead a court to Congress’ intent in 
respect to a particular statute.”); F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 
542 U.S. 155, 176 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment reached by the 
majority in an opinion by Justice Breyer) (“I concur in the judgment of the Court 
because the language of the statute is readily susceptible of the interpretation the 
Court provides . . . .”); see also id. at 163 (majority opinion of Breyer, J.) (“For 
those who find legislative history useful, the House Report’s account should end 
the matter.  Others, by considering carefully the amendment itself and the lack of 
any other plausible purpose, may reach the same conclusion . . . .”). 
20. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 39-108 (applying Breyer’s approach to 
interpretation issues of free speech, federalism, privacy, affirmative action, 
statutory construction, and administrative law); SCALIA supra note 1, at 14-44 
(applying Scalia’s approach to various modalities of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation).  The author believes it a difficult question whether such unified 
treatment of statutory and constitutional interpretation is appropriate.  Justice Alito 
recently has recognized a distinction between the two interpretive problems: 
 
Judicial self-discipline is especially important when federal courts are 
interpreting the Constitution.  In non-constitutional cases, the political 
branches can check what they perceive to be erroneous judicial decisions 
by enacting corrective legislation.  Decisions based on an interpretation of 
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interpretive aids and announced a preference for some over others.  
As Justice Breyer writes, “All judges use similar basic tools to help 
them accomplish the task” of statutory or constitutional 
interpretation.21  This review thus discusses Active Liberty in part by 
comparison and contrast to Justice Scalia’s A Matter of 
Interpretation.  It concludes that Justice Breyer’s willingness to use 
all available information to inform interpretive problems is 
preferable to Justice Scalia’s narrower approach.  But Justice 
Breyer’s statement of his philosophy fails to capitalize on its primary 
strengths and unfortunately lacks sufficient articulation of method. 
Active Liberty is attractively packaged with a red cloth cover 
and glossy dust jacket.  The latter might perhaps be criticized for its 
color scheme and design—red border, white background, and blue 
text and stars, which emphasize political implications in preference 
to the jurisprudential ones (but is a plain black cover, reminiscent of 
a judge’s robe, to be preferred?)—and for the exceedingly large 
reproduction of Justice Breyer’s portrait on the back cover.  Who is 
Justice Breyer’s target audience?  The $21 price tag is steep for a 
reader of paperback bestsellers, but to this reviewer, who assigns 
$100 casebooks, it does not seem unreasonable.  Footnotes would be 
far preferable to the endnotes the editors chose, which, organized as 
they are by confusing reference to blocks of page numbers, are 
the Constitution, by contrast, cannot be checked in this manner, and a 
thoughtful appreciation of the nature and essential limits of the judicial 
function is therefore acutely necessary to protect the democratic values 
that underlie our Constitution. 
 
Written response of Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr., Nominee for the Supreme Court of 
the United States, to United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary 60-61, 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/Alito_Questionnaire.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2006). The problems with Justice Alito’s analysis are at least three-fold.  
First, it is not clear that the error-correcting function is as readily available as 
Justice Alito believes in the legislative context.  See infra note 79 and 
accompanying text (noting that Congress has much to deal with beyond having to 
correct problems wrought by judges through faulty interpretations of legislation).  
Second, at least two error-correcting options exist in the constitutional scheme.  
One is the amendment process.  Another is the much-remarked process of 
changing constitutional interpretations by, over time, altering the make-up of the 
federal judiciary.  Third, the problems Justice Alito remarks with unrestrained 
interpretations are no more significant than problems with too-restrained 
interpretations, which also do violence to the Constitution, but might exist because 
of, not due to the lack of, judicial self-discipline. 
21. BREYER, supra note 1, at 7. 
508 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 25:3 
 
 
                                                
particularly difficult to use.  None of these criticisms relate in any 
way to the substance of the book or detract in any significant manner 
from the reader’s enjoyment of it. 
 
 
II. FINDING “PURPOSE” 
 
The interpretive tradition that Justice Breyer embraces in 
Active Liberty “sees texts as driven by purposes,” and requires 
judges then “to look to consequences, including contemporary 
conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community to be 
affected.”22  The goal, then, is to ensure that the consequences of the 
interpretation accord with the purposes of the text. 
Justice Breyer searches for purposes in constitutional 
interpretation primarily in the interplay between the concepts of so-
called “active liberty”—which he sometimes refers to as “liberty of 
the ancients”—and “modern liberty.”  The former, broadly stated, is 
the people’s collective right to democratic self-government (this 
review sometimes employs the phrase “majoritarian rights”).  The 
latter is a set of individual rights preserved by the Constitution.  
Justice Breyer sees the structure of the Constitution as representing 
primarily a balance between these sometimes consistent, sometimes 
opposed, concerns.  The constitutional interpretive problem, then, 
apparently is to identify the prevailing concern and give it effect.  
And although Justice Breyer does not clearly identify how to resolve 
conflicts that do arise, his insistence on interpreting the text of the 
Constitution—including amendments—as a unified whole23 seems 
to make clear that in preferring majoritarian rights or individual 
rights, judges must permit as little impingement on the other form of 
liberty as possible. 
Active Liberty begins by setting up the interpretive problem 
and Justice Breyer’s approach to dealing with it.  The “Introduction” 
perhaps is inaptly titled: in reality it fits seamlessly into the body of 
the book.  It lays out in skeletal form one of the more interesting 
 
22. BREYER, supra note 1, at 17-18 (internal quotation omitted). 
23. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 
(1999) (“Here is another feature of the Constitution: various words and phrases 
recur in the document.  This feature gives interpreters yet another set of clues as 
they search for constitutional meaning and gives rise to yet another rich technique 
of constitutional interpretation.  I call this technique intratextualism.”). 
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themes of the book—Justice Breyer’s careful and readily 
understandable analysis of the history of the Federal Constitution 
and the balance that it strikes between citizens’ “freedom from 
government coercion” and “freedom to participate in the government 
itself.”24  Each of these purposes, Active Liberty makes clear, is 
reflected in various writings of the Founders.  And Justice Breyer 
also points out that the two purposes may support each other but also 
may be at loggerheads.25  By comparison, Justice Scalia failed in A 
Matter of Interpretation to ground in the Constitution’s text or 
history the source of his interpretive theory.26  Although it 
convincingly states a case for respecting both principles of 
majoritarian rule and individual liberties, Active Liberty comes up 
short.  It does not give the reader a means to know under what 
circumstances one principle should be preferred to the other.27
The historical discussion is the most convincing, and in this 
reviewer’s mind the most enjoyable, portion of the volume.  Justice 
Breyer draws upon the works of historical scholars Jack Rakove, 
Gordon Wood, Bernard Bailyn and Alexander Meikeljohn; cites also 
to papers and books by Akhil Amar, Robert Williams, Edward 
Corwin and Max Farrand; and undertakes his own analysis of James 
Madison’s Federalists 10 and 39.28  In this chapter he describes the 
sometimes confused original understanding of the precise form of 
government the Constitution created: “John Adams, for example, 
 
24. BREYER, supra note 1, at 3.   
25. BREYER, supra note 1, at 31 (“[T]he state government experiments in less 
disciplined democracy had proved disappointing [in securing the modern liberty of 
individuals] . . . , bringing about what some called a new form of despotism.”) 
(citing GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 164 (1776-
1787) (1969)). 
26. Cf. Tribe, supra note 15, at 75-77 (noting that “the Constitution does not  
. . . tell us in any genuinely decisive and authoritative way, exactly what 
constitutes the content of an ‘amendment’” and advocating for the text of the 
Constitution to serve as a starting point for constitutional interpretation rather than 
the sole reference point).  Justice Breyer observes, “The Framers did not say 
specifically what factors judges should take into account when they interpret 
statutes or the Constitution.”  BREYER, supra note 1, at 117. 
27. See Toobin, supra note 2, at 42 (quoting Professor Charles Fried as 
saying, “What is mysterious and really unexplained is the relationship between his 
embrace of democracy in his book and the vigorous enforcement, in which Justice 
Breyer has sometimes enthusiastically participated, of individual rights against 
majority decisions.”). 
28. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 21-29, 140-41 n.13, 19. 
510 THE REVIEW OF LITIGATION [Vol. 25:3 
 
 
                                                
understood the Constitution as seeking to create an Aristotelian 
‘mixed’ form of government.”29  The majority view, that the 
Constitution created a democratic government structure, carried the 
day, but even then, practical as well as philosophical considerations 
placed limits.  “Democracy, of course, could not mean a Greek city-
state.”30  Instead of “the Athenian agora or a New England town 
meeting,” “the people would have to delegate the day-to-day work of 
governance.”31  But the Founders also had learned some practical 
lessons that influenced their philosophical approach to democracy: 
“The reason” why “the Framers [did] not write . . . a Constitution 
that contained” purer democratic structures “is that experience with 
many of these initial forms of democratic government had proved 
disappointing.”32  Instead of a pure democratic structure, the 
Constitution thus reflects “an effort to produce a government 
committed to democratic principle that would prove practically 
workable and that also, as a practical matter, would help protect 
individuals against oppression.”33
In Justice Breyer’s conclusion about the purpose of the 
constitutional structure that ultimately was adopted we find his 
historical support for the thesis that constitutional interpretation 
should be undertaken with an eye to both the liberty to self-govern 
and the individual liberty that the Constitution was crafted to protect.  
He writes of an “interpretive tradition” that “calls for judicial 
restraint,” but nonetheless permits him to celebrate “decisions that . . 
. helped to make ‘We the People’ a phrase that finally includes those 
whom the Constitution originally and intentionally ignored.”34  Once 
again, though, how simultaneously to protect individual liberty and 
respect principles of democratic self-government where those 
interests conflict is left to the reader to ponder.
 
29. BREYER, supra note 1, at 21. 
30. BREYER, supra note 1, at 22.  
31.  BREYER, supra note 1, at 23. 
32. BREYER, supra note 1, at 24.  
33. BREYER, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
34. BREYER, supra note 1, at 17, 20. 
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III. “Living Constitution”? 
 
Active Liberty also broaches the topic of the “living 
Constitution”—an issue debated vociferously perhaps since 
McCulloch v. Maryland, in which Chief Justice Marshall famously 
employed the phrase, “this is a Constitution we are expounding.”35  
In Active Liberty Justice Breyer cites authority for the proposition 
that the phrase “We the people”—which begins the Constitution’s 
preamble—should be understood to mean “‘it is agreed, and with 
every passing moment it is re-agreed, that the people of the United 
States shall be self-governed.’”36 He argues earlier that the 
Constitution is “‘a continuing instrument of government’” and that 
for it to be applied to “‘new subject matter . . . with which the 
framers were not familiar,’” it should be construed by looking to 
purposes and consequences, not merely to text.37
This discussion of continual constitutional renewal, however, 
feels disconnected with Justice Breyer’s refrain that judges must be 
restrained, humble, not willful, and are not permitted to “‘enforce 
whatever [they] think[] best.’”38  Between its description of what its 
detractors might describe as an “activist” interpretive philosophy and 
its prescription of essential attributes of judges that will protect 
against such perceived evils, Active Liberty fails to offer a method 
for ascertaining “purpose” and “consequence” that does not entail 
substantial subjectivity.  Justice Scalia previously argued that “there 
is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be the 
guiding principle of the evolution” of the Constitution to 
accommodate modern-day realities.  Justice Breyer argues that 
recognizing the purposes of the document will permit its natural 
evolution, checked primarily by a healthy dose of judicial self-
restraint.  Justice Scalia surely would respond with a different 
understanding of “purpose.” 
 
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).  Justice Scalia disagrees with that use 
of Justice Marshall’s words: the “quotation from [McCulloch] refutes, rather than 
supports, that approach.”  McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2756 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852-53 (1989)). 
36. BREYER, supra note 1, at 25 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE 
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 14-15 (1948)). 
37. BREYER, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF 
LIBERTY 109 (3d ed. 1960)).  
38. BREYER, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
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Active Liberty relies on “[j]udges” to “understand the human 
need to plan in reliance upon law, the need for predictability, the 
need for stability” and therefore to avoid “too radical, too frequent 
legal change.”39  This will be criticized as placing too much faith in 
an unelected judiciary.  Justice Breyer responds in his final chapter, 
“A Serious Objection,” that there is nothing inherently more 
objective about an originalist philosophy like Justice Scalia’s.40  He 
points out that subjectivity is inherent even in the determination to 
rely on text alone because there is no definitive evidence, either 
textual or historical, that the Founders intended the constitutional 
text to be final and definitive.41
Justice Scalia, too, concedes that his originalist theory of 
constitutional interpretation permits subjectivity: “I do not suggest . . 
. that originalists always agree upon their answer.  There is plenty of 
room for disagreement as to what original meaning was . . . .”42  And 
while decrying notions of evolution of the Federal Constitution, 
Justice Scalia is quite ready to permit such evolution to occur under 
certain circumstances.  One much-observed example is Justice 
Scalia’s reference to the “trajectory of the First Amendment” to 
determine whether realities that were never envisioned by the 
Founders when drafting the First Amendment might nonetheless be 
within the original meaning of its text.43
 
 
IV. ACTIVE LIBERTY IN APPLICATION 
 
Justice Breyer turns next to seven “Applications” of his 
philosophy.  Those applications arise in the contexts of speech, 
federalism, privacy, affirmative action, statutory interpretation, and 
administrative law.44  Certainly it must be said that Justice Breyer 
has not shied away in this volume from the most challenging issues 
facing courts, and the Supreme Court, in the modern era.  Nor, 
considering the breadth of apparent application, does he concede any 
 
39. BREYER, supra note 1, at 119. 
40. BREYER, supra note 1, at 117. 
41. BREYER, supra note 1, at 117. 
42. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 45. 
43. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 45. 
44. BREYER, supra note 1, at vii.  
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limitation on the application of looking to purposes and 
consequences to interpret texts.45
It is here, though, that Justice Breyer’s analysis is at its 
weakest.  Active Liberty is quite long on application, but 
unfortunately short on method.  In each example of application—
speech, federalism, privacy (literally,46 rather than the hot-button 
questions of substantive due process limitations on legislation), and 
affirmative action—up until his discussions of statutory 
interpretation and administrative law, which are addressed below, 
Justice Breyer gives an example of a case, indicates what would be 
his preferred holding (usually what he argued in dissent), and 
justifies that result by reference to purposes and consequences.  
Justice Breyer’s analyses are fully persuasive as post hoc 
explanations.  For example, in his discussion of free speech, Justice 
Breyer addresses campaign finance reform.  He notes first that it is 
far too facile simply to utter the mantra, “speech is speech,” and 
therefore to believe that all legislation having the effect of lessening 
communication must violate the First Amendment protection of the 
freedom of speech.  Campaign finance reform legislation seeks to 
navigate a course between the Scylla of First Amendment rights and 
the Charybdis of protecting citizens’ rights to self-government, 
which, Justice Breyer persuasively argues (citing to facts such as 
would come before the Court in a classic Brandeis brief) are 
undermined by corporate donations.47  Viewing the First 
 
45. In A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia is not so ambitious, and does 
not attempt such a universal application of his textualist philosophy.  Instead, 
Justice Scalia limits its application to select circumstances of what he views to be 
perversities resulting from looking beyond statutory or constitutional text.  See, 
e.g., infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing Scalia’s refusal to look 
at the history of the statute in question in Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 
543 U.S. 50 (2004)). 
46. The privacy examples Justice Breyer employs in Active Liberty deal with 
“a person’s power to control what others can come to know about him or her.”  
BREYER, supra note 1, at 66.  He lists a range of problems arising from laws 
dealing with government monitoring of citizens’ activities as well as private 
gathering and maintenance of personal information.  BREYER, supra note 1, at 66-
69. 
47. BREYER, supra note 1, at 43-48.  Justice Breyer has discussed elsewhere 
the importance of assistance by amici curiae in bringing to the Court legislative 
facts that better inform the Justices’ understanding of the practical implications of 
the issues.  This is apparently a method Justice Breyer would propose judges use to 
divine the “consequences” of a particular decision. 
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Amendment protection of the “freedom of speech” as part of the 
entire constitutional structure, Justice Breyer is persuaded that 
appropriate campaign finance reform legislation can “democratize 
the influence that money can bring to bear upon the electoral process 
. . . encouraging greater public participation,” which is the essence of 
his “active liberty” concern.48  At the same time, he argues, this 
ultimately increases speech by fulfilling important First Amendment 
goals.  This argument boils down to saying that, by breaking up the 
political-speech oligopoly, competition in the marketplace of ideas 
will be enhanced.49
None of the examples, though, show how a judge, or a 
lawyer, should approach the problem.  They instead are post hoc 
rationalizations of results that Justice Breyer says are preferable. In 
the introduction, Justice Breyer even warns us of this failing: “To 
illustrate a theme is not to present a general theory of constitutional 
interpretation.”50  The unfortunate result, however, is that the 
philosophy Justice Breyer advances has an “I know it when I see 
it”51 quality—what one reviewer has called “an ad-hoc attempt at 
political compromise as much as the application of legal 
principles”—that recently has frustrated at least one federal judge.52  
 
48. BREYER, supra note 1, at 47. 
49. BREYER, supra note 1, at 47.  Justice Breyer’s antitrust background may 
be lurking behind his analysis, if this review has accurately encapsulated it.  See 
Toobin, supra note 2, at 38 (noting Justice Breyer’s service as an attorney in the 
antitrust division of the Justice Department). 
50. BREYER, supra note 1, at 7. 
51. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be 
embraced within that shorthand description [obscenity]; and perhaps I could never 
succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the motion 
picture involved in this case is not that.”). 
52. See Toobin, supra note 2, at 39-40 (discussing U.S. District Judge 
Lawrence K. Karlton’s opinion in Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 383 F. Supp. 2d 
1229, 1244 n.2 (E.D. Cal. 2005)).  In Newdow, Judge Karlton complained about 
what he thought was a standardless body of law interpreting the First Amendment 
Establishment Clause, exemplified by the Court’s decisions last Term in McCreary 
County and Van Orden, which, respectively, rejected and permitted the placement 
of “Ten Commandments” statutes on public property.  Newdow, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 
1244.  Justice Breyer did not write either opinion, but joined the majority in 
McCreary County and concurred in the judgment in Van Orden.  In his Van Orden 
concurrence, Justice Breyer explained: “[T]here is ‘no simple and clear measure 
which by precise application can readily and invariably demark the permissible 
from the impermissible.’ . . .  One must adhere to the basic purposes of the [First 
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And to the extent that Justice Scalia has provided a method, in Active 
Liberty Justice Breyer does not propose a workable alternative. 
 
 
V. SEARCHING FOR AGREEMENT IN PHILOSOPHIES 
 
Turning the page, the reader arrives at Justice Breyer’s 
application in Active Liberty of his philosophy to the process of 
statutory interpretation.53  Initially, there is something fundamentally 
different about how Justice Breyer conceives of this task in the 
overall scheme of his analysis from the treatment Justice Scalia gave 
the subject in A Matter of Interpretation.  Rather than treat statutory 
interpretation as a task parallel in nature to constitutional 
interpretation, Justice Breyer treats statutory interpretation as an 
“application”—one more way in which his purposes and 
consequences approach to constitutional decision-making plays out 
in practice.54  On further analysis, the difference appears to be one of 
organization rather than substance. 
Amendment’s Religion] Clauses.”  125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005) (quoting School 
Dist. of Abingdon Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberger, J., 
concurring)).  Justice Breyer “s[aw] no test-related substitute for the exercise of 
legal judgment,” so long as that judgment “remain[s] faithful to the underlying 
purposes of the Clauses.”  Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
When confronted by interviewer Jeffrey Toobin with Judge Karlton’s complaint 
about the lack of guidance, Justice Breyer responded “‘That’s a problem for the 
person in question. . . .  [T]here is also common-law guidance, which is by 
example. . . .  You teach by example.  You don’t go too far too fast.’”  Toobin, 
supra note 2, at 40 (quoting Justice Breyer). 
53. According to Justice Scalia, statutory interpretation is “by far the greatest 
part of what [American judges] do.”  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 13-14.  Critics 
second the importance of the process of interpreting legislation.  According to 
Professor Mary Ann Glendon, “[a] comparatist with a special interest in 
contemporary European law,” American lawyers are under-trained in the process 
of “dealing with enacted law” or “the art of legislative drafting.”  Mary Ann 
Glendon, Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 95, 95-96 (1997).  For this reason, Professor 
Glendon tells us, Karl Llewellyn, the principal drafter of Article 2 of the U.C.C., 
relied on German statutes as models.  Id. at 96. 
54. Compare BREYER, supra note 1 (Table of Contents) (listing “Statutory 
Interpretation” under the heading “Applications”) with SCALIA, supra note 1, at v 
(titling the role of U.S. federal courts as one that includes interpretation of both the 
Constitution and laws).  Much ground exists for discussion concerning whether 
statutes and the Constitution should be interpreted in like manner, with perhaps 
more care given to the Constitution, or whether there is some fundamental 
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Both this chapter on statutory interpretation and the next 
chapter, dealing with administrative law,55 are unique in Active 
Liberty: they are the only two in which Justice Breyer attempts 
seriously to articulate a methodological approach.  The method 
Justice Breyer proposes is to envision a hypothetical “reasonable 
member of Congress.”56  (Is it only this reviewer who takes delight 
in Justice Breyer’s calling the “reasonable member of Congress” 
construct a “fiction”?).  This reviewer, who tries to instill in students 
the intuition for reducing to rationality abstracted legal doctrine, 
finds the “reasonable Congressperson” approach particularly 
attractive.  Does Justice Scalia as well?  In his articulation of 
“textualist” idealogy, Justice Scalia prescribes construing a statute 
“reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”57  Justice Scalia later 
describes his textualist ideology as a search for what statutory text 
“would reasonably be understood to mean.”58  For his part, Justice 
Breyer is not seeking statutory purpose in a vacuum.  He believes 
also in starting with “the statute’s language.”59  To start, the 
colleagues’ approaches are not so different. 
The detente that appears at first blush ends before the second.  
In Active Liberty Justice Breyer observes that statutory construction 
is not an interesting topic if a reasonable interpretation of the 
statutory language produces a definitive result.60  He thus articulates 
the importance of using all available information—“the statute’s 
language, its structure, and its history in an effort to determine the 
statute’s purpose.”61  The goal is to ascertain the text’s meaning.  
distinction between the two interpretive endeavors.  See supra note 9 and 
accompanying text. 
55. The chapter on administrative law is very similar to the chapter on 
statutory interpretation, which makes sense—much of the judicial role in 
administrative law is the process of statutory interpretation, determining what 
mandate Congress gave to the particular administrative agency.  But the chapter 
also includes discussion of the non-delegation concerns attendant on the creation 
of a fourth branch of government.  BREYER, supra note 1, at 103.  Justice Breyer 
prefers a hands-off approach to the delegation question, permitting Congress to 
employ administrative assistance (with its attendant advantages of expertise) to 
assist “an inexpert public” in its self-government tasks.  Id. at 102-03. 
56. BREYER, supra note 1, at 88. 
57. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23. 
58. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 144 (responding to Prof. Dworkin). 
59. BREYER, supra note 1, at 86. 
60. BREYER, supra note 1, at 85. 
61. BREYER, supra note 1, at 86. 
Summer 2006] ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION 517 
 
 
                                                
Thus, “nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded.”62  
Isolated from the contention surrounding interpretive philosophy, the 
merits of Justice Breyer’s approach—tried and true in other areas of 
the law63—are almost too obvious to articulate.  Indeed, the only 
way that employing all available resources in the interpretive process 
might be problematic is if misleading information becomes part of 
the mix.64
To watchers of the modern Supreme Court, as well as to 
interested lay-persons, Justice Scalia’s professions of a “textualist” 
approach to statutory interpretation are well-known and might be 
considered quite influential.65  Under this philosophy, Justice Scalia 
would stick to the language of the Constitution or a statute and let 
the chips fall where they may.  Thus, as the lone dissenting voice in 
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, Justice Scalia argued, “‘If 
Congress enacted into law something different than what it intended, 
 
62. BREYER, supra note 1, at 18 (citing sources including LEARNED HAND, 
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 109 (3d ed. 1960)). 
63. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 401, 402 (stating the rule that all relevant evidence is 
admissible). 
Justice Breyer’s and Justice Scalia’s differing philosophies about the amount 
of extrinsic evidence that may permissibly be considered in the interpretive 
process is apparent in other aspects of their jurisprudence.  It becomes apparent in 
the debate between the colleagues on the use of foreign authorities in judicial 
opinions.  Justice Scalia “do[es] not use foreign law in the interpretation of the 
United States Constitution.”  Relevance of Foreign Law, supra note 1, at 6 
(comments of Justice Scalia).  Justice Breyer takes a different approach: “‘If here I 
have a human being called a judge in a different country dealing with a similar 
problem, why don’t I read what he says if it’s similar enough?  Maybe I’ll learn 
something.’”  Relevance of Foreign Law, supra note 1, at 7 (comments of Justice 
Breyer) (quoting his own earlier comments). 
64. This is precisely Justice Scalia’s objection.  See SCALIA, supra note 1, at 
34-36 (referring to “the manipulability of legislative history”). 
65. Justice Scalia’s interpretive philosophy has come to be called “strict 
constructionism” by many.  In announcing the nomination of Harriet Miers to 
replace Justice O’Connor, President George W. Bush—who previously had 
expressed preference for Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence—said of his nominee:  
“I’m interested in people that will be strict constructionists, and Harriet Miers 
shares that philosophy.”  Press Release, The White House, President Holds Press 
Conference (Oct. 4, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/ 
20051004-1.html.  Justice Scalia rejects the phrase, however.  “Textualism should 
not be confused with so-called strict-constructionism, a degraded form of 
textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute.  I am not a strict 
constructionist, and no one ought to be. . . .”  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23. 
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then it should amend the statute to conform to its intent.  It is beyond 
our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors . . . .’”66
In Koons, a Truth-in-Lending-Act (TILA) case in which the 
Court held that Congress did not amend the statute to remove 
liability limitations that had been contained in it since its 1968 
enactment, Justice Scalia quoted the opinion in Lamie v. United 
States Trustee,67 a bankruptcy case, for the proposition that the Court 
should not correct Congress’s errors.68  In so doing, he exposed his 
approach to one of the most serious possible criticisms.  Anecdotally, 
unbending textualist philosophy appears to be employed selectively 
in cases in which a judge is less concerned about reaching a correct 
outcome and is commensurately more willing, in the name of strict 
adherence to principle, to require Congress to revisit a problem 
statute.  The philosophy of leaving to the legislative branch 
responsibility for correcting obvious drafting errors or oversights has 
been applied readily enough in the contexts of consumer-law statutes 
like TILA.  In other areas—such as criminal law (“uses a firearm” in 
relation to a drug crime does not include trading a gun for drugs)69—
Justice Scalia has been all too ready to interpret statutory language 
contrary to the plain textualist meaning in order to reach the result 
that he believes Congress obviously intended, although it would be a 
simple enough matter once again to have required Congress to 
amend the statute, using more precise language to account for a 
situation it did not envision when writing the text originally.70
 
66. 543 U.S. 50, 76 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 
540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004)).  This was just the rationale of the Fourth Circuit 
majority that interpreted the statute as having been amended.  See Koons Buick 
Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 319 F.3d 119, 128 (4th Cir. 2003) (“However, the 
critical point of law—and it is critical—is that we do not know what Congress 
intended; all that we have before us is the amended statute from which to 
determine intent.”), rev’d, 543 U.S. 50 (2004). 
67. 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 
68. See Koons, 543 U.S. at 76 (stating that it is not the province of the 
Supreme Court to rescue Congress from its errors). 
69. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23-24 (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 
223 (1993)). 
70. On the danger of selective application of textualist philosophy, Justice 
Scalia concedes that “there are ambiguities involved, and hence opportunities for 
judicial willfulness, in other techniques of interpretation as well—the canons of 
construction, for example . . . .”  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 36. 
Another explanation for the strict textualism applied in consumer codes giving 
way in the criminal context might be based on comparing two attributes of the 
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The “uses a gun” example suffers the same failing that this 
reviewer noted regarding Justice Breyer’s application of his purposes 
and consequences approach.  Why is it so clear that “uses a gun” or 
“do you use a cane” does not mean barter or decoration?71  Justice 
Scalia simply knows it when he sees it.72
The Koons majority, though, reversed the Fourth Circuit’s 
holding.  Koons was a case in which the addition of a clause to a 
previously clear statutory sub-paragraph rendered the sub-paragraph 
seemingly unclear on its face.  But three primary reasons supported 
reversal: (1) there was a plain-language reading of the statute that 
supported reversal, relying on the fact that the word “sub-paragraph” 
statutory schemes—their relative length, complexity, and the frequency with 
which Congress revisits them.  TILA and the bankruptcy code, for examples, are 
both lengthy and complex and the regular subjects of congressional tweaking.  A 
third possible attribute is a relatively small body of common law experience 
underlying the statutes.  Those attributes seem to support adherence to a textualist 
philosophy.  Criminal codes usually are shorter, if not less complex, and they may 
gather less frequent congressional attention, and have substantial common-law 
underpinnings.  Those three attributes might explain differences between statutory 
and constitutional interpretation as well as differences in approaches to different 
codes. 
71. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 24. 
72. Justice Scalia’s preference for common-sense reading of statutory text 
puts him in good company.  According to Justice Holmes, “the meaning of a 
sentence is to be felt rather than to be proved.”  United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 
488, 496 (1911).  He also stated that “there is no canon against using common 
sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.”  Roschen v. Ward, 
279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929).  One recent dissent in a lower court provides another 
example: 
 
A host separately asked two prospective guests what they liked to drink.  
One said, “I like bourbon and water.”  The other said, “I like beer and 
wine.”  When the second guest arrived at the event, the host served the 
guest a glass of beer mixed with wine. “What’s that awful drink?” said 
the guest, to which the host answered, “You said you liked beer and 
wine.”  Replied the guest: “Pfui!  You know what I meant.  Quit playing 
word games and get me something I can drink.”   
 
OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 600 (6th Cir. 2005) (Rogers, J., 
dissenting).  Use in legal argument of analogies to alcoholic beverages has a 
venerable pedigree.  See BREYER, supra note 1, at 68 (“To maintain preexisting 
projection, we must look for new legal bottles to hold our wine.”); see also Max 
Huffman, Judge Painter’s Forty Rules, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1011, 1022 (2003) 
(book review) (comparing a reduction in pages to a beer stein full of lager with no 
head). 
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in statutory text is a term of art; (2) throughout the voluminous 
history of amendments to TILA, Congress never made any textual 
change that would support the reading the Fourth Circuit had 
adopted, despite regularly having amended the provision at issue; 
and (3) the change the Fourth Circuit held had occurred could not 
possibly be considered rational legislative policy.73  The strongest 
argument the Fourth Circuit panel, and Justice Scalia in dissent, 
could muster was that it would be inappropriate to rescue Congress 
from its drafting error.  For support Justice Scalia cited to Lamie.74  
The failure to consider available evidence of the statute’s meaning is 
all the more troubling in Koons because it did not require resort to 
“floor debates and (especially) committee reports,” the process 
Justice Scalia derides.75  Evidence was available in Koons of the 
history of TILA as enacted into law by Congress and signed by the 
President.76
The Koons example demonstrates the benefits of an 
approach—to which Justice Breyer subscribes in Active Liberty—of 
considering all information that bears on the interpretive question, 
rather than merely some narrow subset of information.  The criticism 
that Justice Scalia makes of this approach, that misleading 
 
73. See Brief of the Am. Bankers Assoc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Koons Buick Pontiac GMC Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50 (2004) (No. 03-
377), 2004 WL 865265 (arguing that the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the language 
of TILA was wrong). 
74. Koons, 543 U.S. at 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Lamie is poor authority for 
the proposition in any event.  Rather than dealing with poorly drafted language, in 
Lamie the Court addressed, and refused to ignore, clearly drafted language that 
simply did not say what the petitioner argued Congress meant.  See Lamie, 540 
U.S. at 535-36 (stating that the plain meaning of the word “attorney” is preferred 
in order to avoid confusion).  Lamie was thus a clear application of Justice 
Jackson’s admonition that the Court should “not inquire what the legislature 
meant; [it should] only ask what the statute means.”  Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert 
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397 (1951), quoted in SCALIA, supra note 1, at 23, 
n.29. 
75. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 34. 
76. See Koons, 543 U.S. at 54 (stating that the purpose of TILA was to 
disclose credit terms in order to inform the consumer, and discussing the 
provisions of the original civil-liability provision for creditors); Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 3-9, Koons, 543 U.S. 50 (No. 03-377) (arguing based on amended 
statutory language rather than legislative history). 
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information may find its way into the mix,77 is overstated.  First, 
judges would not be worth their salaries if they could not draw 
distinctions between relevant information and red herrings.  Second, 
in A Matter of Interpretation Justice Scalia does not give empirical 
evidence supporting his concern.  He provides no example of 
legislative history that, when fully considered, would contravene, 
rather than merely aid in interpreting, statutory text.  Instead, he says 
the opposite.  He finds next to no examples in which he would 
change his vote had he relied on legislative history.78  Finally, 
Justice Scalia fails in his dismissal of the topic to distinguish 
between different sorts of available information.  For example, a 
history of prior enactments of the same statute surely are deserving 
of more weight than statements to an empty chamber in floor 
debates.  Indeed, ripe as Justice Scalia’s analysis is for criticism, in 
this reviewer’s mind a primary drawback of Active Liberty is its 
complete failure to articulate the method of “using all available 
information” in the context of statutory interpretation. 
A more optimistic understanding of the vagaries of seemingly 
selective application of textualist philosophy is that unbending 
adherence most often occurs in dissent, as seen in Koons.  Why, one 
might ask, would an intellectual giant of Justice Scalia’s stature 
simply fail to recognize that were his arguments to command a 
majority, the result would be waste and expense?  A Congress 
currently overwhelmed with the Iraq War, Hurricane Katrina, and 
judicial appointments (of course, only the first and third of which 
were relevant when Koons was decided, but something akin to the 
second was predictable) would be forced to scurry to correct a 
seeming glitch in the text of TILA that confused next to nobody.  If 
the answer is that formalism in interpretation is permitted to trump 
reason, it is a cause for serious concern.  The answer is much easier 
to accept if it is only that rigid textualist philosophy is reserved for 
expression in dissents (as in Koons), concurrences, or extra-judicial 
writings and speeches.  Often this is the case.  Justice Scalia is 
famous for his concurrences in which he rejects the narrow portion 
 
77. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 34 (“One of the routine tasks of the Washington 
lawyer-lobbyist is to draft language that sympathetic legislators can recite in a 
prewritten ‘floor debate’—or, even better, insert into a committee report.”). 
78. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 36. 
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of a majority opinion in which legislative history is discussed.79  
And instances are rare—this reviewer knows of none—in which an 
express refusal to consider all available information in a case of true 
ambiguity has commanded a majority of the Supreme Court. 
In any event, as Justice Scalia himself observed: “Frankly, 
[refusing to use legislative history] has made very little difference” 
in the results he has reached.80  If that is true (although it is 
questionable whether an “honest textualist”81 would know, because a 
review of the legislative history must be thought to taint a pure 
exposition of statutory language), Justice Scalia’s method is simply 
another approach to the same result. 
Of course, reasoning by anecdote necessarily is inadequate.  
Both Justice Breyer in Active Liberty and Justice Scalia in A Matter 
of Interpretation fall into that trap (and this reviewer now has joined 
them).  It always will be possible to point to egregious examples of 
injustice attendant on following one interpretive philosophy or the 
other, or to drum up circumstances in which one judge or another 
apparently has deviated from a previously stated approach.  
Unfortunately, a principled comparison of differing interpretive 
philosophies would be more difficult even than crafting one’s own 
philosophy, for deciding whether textualism or purposes and 
consequences produces better decision results would require: (1) 
determining what are the ideal decision results, and (2) testing both 
philosophies to determine which reaches them more often.  That 
comparison is beyond the scope of this review. 
But it does appear that there is some common ground 
between Justice Breyer’s purpose-centered approach and Justice 
Scalia’s textualist approach—at least in the arena of statutory 
interpretation.  It would indeed be a worthy outcome of the recent 
publication of Active Liberty if it permitted a synthesis of what are 
seemingly irreconcilable theories of statutory interpretation.  A 
synthesis would require some bending by both sides, but neither 
Active Liberty nor A Matter of Interpretation give the impression that 
there is not room for movement.  For example, Justice Breyer is 
mainly concerned with what he sees as the consequences of true 
 
79. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 
176 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that he concurs because the statutory 
language lends itself to the majority’s interpretation).  
80.  SCALIA, supra note 1, at 36. 
81. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 28. 
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literalism.  It is incorrect, he says, “to answer a lost driver’s request 
for directions, ‘Where am I?’ with the words ‘In a car.’”82  On that 
point I am confident Justice Scalia would agree.83  Just as he reads 
“uses a gun” to mean something other than bartering with it, he 
believes the sentence “I put the saddle on the bay” has a clear 
meaning,84 which of course it does, and Justice Breyer would, in 
turn, agree.  The colleagues agree that the context in which words are 
used matters in their interpretation.85
Justice Breyer’s search for purpose in a statute also should 
not be as controversial as it might seem.  Justice Scalia has all but 
admitted a search for purpose as well.  In his interpretive exercise, he 
seeks the “import” of the statute—which depends on its “purpose.”86  
Justice Scalia has admitted also a willingness to correct obvious 
 
82. BREYER, supra note 1, at 87.   
83. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004), provides an example of the colleagues’ 
agreement that literalist interpretations of text are not necessarily dispositive.  
Interpreting the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act to prevent the assertion 
of jurisdiction by a U.S. antitrust court over claims by foreign plaintiffs alleging 
harm in foreign commerce, Justice Breyer wrote for the Court and Justice Scalia 
concurred in the judgment.  The text of the statute permits the exercise of 
jurisdiction if the conduct complained of has an effect on domestic U.S. 
commerce, and that effect gives rise to “a claim” under the U.S. antitrust laws.  
Plaintiffs argued that “a claim” meant any claim, not necessarily their claims.  Id. 
at 173.  The Court held that evidence, contained in the legislative history of the 
statute and in an appropriate understanding of the deterrence rationale of the U.S. 
antitrust laws, demonstrated a literalist interpretation of the provision could not 
prevail, and effectively rewrote the statutory text to read “the plaintiff’s claim.”  
Id. at 173-74.  Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, “Despite their linguistic logic, 
[plaintiffs’] arguments are not convincing. . . .  At most, [plaintiffs’] linguistic 
arguments might show that [plaintiffs’] reading is the more natural reading of the 
statutory language.”  Id. at 173.  Justice Scalia in concurrence would have held that 
the literalist interpretation must give way to principles of deference to foreign 
sovereigns’ right to regulate within their own borders.  Id. at 176 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
84. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 26. 
85. Compare SCALIA, supra note 1, at 144 (noting that “the import of 
language depends upon its context, which includes the occasion for, and hence the 
purpose of, its utterance”), with BREYER, supra note 1, at 17 (referring to an 
interpretive tradition that “sees texts as driven by purposes”). 
On the other hand, the breadth of the search for context is another question.  
Justice Breyer points in Active Liberty to an example—the wayward driver—of 
context derived by reference to external factors.  Justice Scalia’s “gun” example 
demonstrates context drawn from the text.  There may be less agreement here than 
it seems. 
86. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 144. 
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errors—termed “scriveners’ errors”—in statutory text.87  And Justice 
Scalia is quick to point out that his brand of textualism looks for 
natural meaning in the text.  Is the real challenge in producing a 
synthesis only in finding common ground in the appropriate breadth 
of a search for statutory purpose? 
This is the point at which, if each approach can be bent a 
small amount, a unified rule might emerge.  Justice Breyer’s 
willingness to use all available information, which this review has 
praised, could be limited such that judges’ consideration of sources 
beyond the text is undertaken with a jaundiced eye—especially to the 
extent that a statement in legislative history reflects one or several 
legislators’ views, rather than the views of the entire legislative 
body.88  But Justice Scalia’s textualist philosophy could bend too.  If 
an adherent recognizes that the search for meaning in words requires 
an understanding of the context in which they are used, resorting to 
truly reliable external sources should not be prohibited.  For 
example, although “I put the saddle on the bay”89 does not require 
any help for the reader to understand its meaning, “I saw the bay” 
does.  If textualist philosophy will permit judges to look no further, 
they are hamstrung. 
And a decision about how far outside the text to look can be 
left to the wisdom and experience of the interpreting judge.  For this 
synthesis to work, it will require faith in the co-equal branches of 
government to fulfill their responsibilities to appoint and confirm the 
sort of careful judges that can be trusted to execute their interpretive 
duties in a principled manner. 
 
 
VI. WHAT IS ACTIVISM? 
 
Because activism was this review’s starting point, the final 
question is whether Justice Breyer’s interpretive approach or the 
textualist approach of Justice Scalia is more deserving of the now-
 
87. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 20-21; see also Ronald Dworkin, Comment to 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 49, 115 (1997) (stating that Scalia admits that courts should remedy 
“scrivener’s error”). 
88. Extending the analogy to the rules of evidence, see supra note 63, perhaps 
extra-textual sources should only be used if their probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.  See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
89. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 26. 
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pejorative label “activist.”  That otherwise meaningless term recently 
has been defined in connection with the spate of Supreme Court 
nominations to replace retiring Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and the 
late Chief Justice William Rehnquist: “Judicial activism,” according 
to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s questionnaire to White House 
Counsel Harriet Miers, nominated to replace Justice O’Connor, is 
defined as including the “tendency by the judiciary toward problem-
solution rather than grievance-resolution” and the “tendency by the 
judiciary to impose itself upon other institutions in the manner of an 
administrator with continuing oversight responsibilities.”90  
Justice Breyer’s approach risks a court overstepping its 
bounds and ascribing to the legislature an intent that should not 
properly be ascribed.  Whether and how often that occurs is a matter 
for empirical research, but this reviewer proposes it is a rare 
occurrence.  The purposes and consequences approach in Active 
Liberty must not be confused with an attempt to shoulder the role of 
a co-equal branch of government.  Active Liberty is loaded with 
indicators that Justice Breyer considers the judge’s role to be a 
deferential one.91  Statistics on votes to overturn congressional 
legislation bear this out.92  
By contrast, Justice Scalia, and those who subscribe to his 
proffered methodology—a set that Justice Breyer “hope[s]” is “fairly 
small in number”93—at least in cases such as Koons, 
unapologetically do violence to the result the legislature sought to 
produce in the name of remaining faithful to its text.  Justice Scalia 
“reject[s] intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the 
 
90. Written response of Harriet Miers, Nominee for the Supreme Court of the 
United States, to the United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, available 
at http://www.npr.org/documents/2005/oct/miers/miersquestionnaire.pdf.  A 
substantially similar question was posed to Justice Alito, nominated to replace 
Justice O’Connor after Miers withdrew herself from consideration in the fall of 
2005.  Written response of Samuel Anthony Alito, Jr., Nominee for the Supreme 
Court of the United States, to United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary 
60-61, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/Alito_Questionnaire.pdf.  
91. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 1,  at 17 (“Courts are ill-equipped to make 
the investigations which should precede most legislation . . . [and] a judge’s 
agreement or disagreement about the wisdom of a law has nothing to do with the 
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
92. See supra note 2 (noting that Breyer voted to strike down laws twenty-
eight percent of the time, which was less often than any other Justice). 
93. BREYER, supra note 1, at 132. 
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law.”94  His confessed goal?  To influence Congress’s resort to floor-
debates and committee reports to clarify the meaning of the enacted 
statutory text95—in other words, to teach a co-equal branch of 
government how to go about its business.  A Matter of Interpretation 
is rife with disdain for the modern legislative process.  In modern 
days, Justice Scalia says, 
 
[t]he floor is rarely crowded for a debate, the 
members generally being occupied with committee 
business and reporting to the floor only when a 
quorum call is demanded or a vote is to be taken.  
And as for committee reports, it is not even certain 
that the members of the issuing committees have 
found time to read them.96
 
The undisguised import of Justice Scalia’s discussion of 
legislative history is that by ignoring it, the Court hopefully will 
cause Congress to stop creating it and instead legislate in some more 
appropriate fashion.  If any judicial endeavor is susceptible to being 
labeled “problem solution” or “oversight,” it is that one.  Justice 
Breyer’s stated goal of determining the purposes of the text being 
interpreted and considering whether the consequences of a particular 
interpretation meet those purposes, must be thought the less activist 
approach. 
This reviewer finds most pleasing the acknowledgment in 
Active Liberty of the challenges judges face in the exercise of 
interpretation, whether constitutional or statutory—an 
acknowledgment that stands in stark contrast to Justice Scalia’s 
seemingly blind faith in the clarity of the English language.97  
Regrettably, Active Liberty nonetheless disappoints.  With the 
limited exception of his chapters on statutory interpretation and 
administrative law (and their invocation of the reasonable 
Congressperson and the use of all available information), Justice 
 
94. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 31. 
95. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 34. 
96. SCALIA, supra note 1, at 32. 
97. In Professor Tribe’s words, Justice Scalia fails to “concede how difficult 
the task is; [to] avoid all pretense that it can be reduced to a passive process of 
discovering rather than constructing an interpretation.”  Lawrence H. Tribe, 
Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 49, 71 (1997).  
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Breyer has failed to prescribe a ground-up methodological approach 
to understanding the meaning of ambiguous texts.  He demonstrates 
that reliance on purposes and consequences is effective post hoc as a 
means to rationalize a result already reached, but its use as an 
interpretive tool presumes an ex ante ability to determine a text’s 
“purpose.”98  That determination might be thought as monumental a 
task as the very interpretive exercise being undertaken.  This failure 
to prescribe a method is particularly disappointing because Justice 
Breyer, as the voice for the Court’s ideological center, is seemingly 
well positioned to lead a majority of the Court in applying a coherent 
interpretive philosophy. 
Instead, like Justice Scalia’s A Matter of Interpretation, 
Active Liberty probably serves the reader best by providing readers 
insight into the thinking of one of this Nation’s nine most influential 
jurists.  This reviewer has reduced a particularly important insight 
into a pithy phrase for the title of the review: Justice Breyer 
forcefully argues that all available information bearing on difficult 
interpretive issues should be considered.  In fact, in possible 
derogation from the analysis in the prior paragraph, this 
methodological tool does promise majority acceptance—see, for 
 
98. I am not as troubled by the ability to discern “consequences” of an 
interpretation.  For one thing, assistance by amici curiae might be a sufficient 
source of expertise.  In Empagran, the United States and Federal Trade 
Commission submitted a brief and presented argument as amici curiae discussing 
what became a central theme in the Court’s opinion—the concern that the literalist 
interpretation of the statute urged on the Court by plaintiffs would have the 
consequence of undermining government cartel enforcement efforts.  See Brief of 
the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, F. Hoffman-LaRoche 
Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) (stating that the 
meaning of the statutory language must be analyzed in the context it was used, not 
in isolation); Transcript of Oral Argument, Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 
2004 WL 234125 (stating that when faced with two different interpretations, the 
court should chose the one that respects international law and does not antagonize 
the allies of the United States).  Justice Breyer has commented that brief writing 
can be a means of fulfilling lawyers’ important “public service role . . . as law 
reformer . . . .  [W]e all depend upon lawyers to help shape the law . . . through 
judicial decisions.”  Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U. S. Supreme Court, “Our 
Civic Commitment,” Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar 
Association (Aug. 4, 2001), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/ 
sp_08-04-01.html.  This is in part because courts do not have a means on their own 
of ascertaining consequences.  Id.  (“[W]e, who are not expert in thermal imaging 
devices or computerized data bases, needed to understand the relevant 
technologies, their state of development, where they might lead.”). 
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example, Koons—in an evolving Supreme Court.  And even the gulf 
between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia does not in all situations 
appear insurmountable.  Active Liberty demonstrates a reasoned 
thought process that should encourage efforts toward bridging the 
gap.  All this, and much else about Active Liberty, make it well worth 
the read.  
